Harassment and Capabilities:
Discrimination and Liability in Wetzel v Glen
St. Andrew Living Community, LLC
Martha C. Nussbaum†
I. WHAT MARSHA WETZEL WAS UNABLE TO DO
Following the death of her long-term partner, Marsha Wetzel, openly lesbian, moved into Glen St. Andrew Living Community, a residential community for older adults.1 Almost immediately she faced “a torrent of physical and verbal abuse” from the
other residents, targeting her sexual orientation.2 She complained
repeatedly to management.3 Instead of helping her, “the staff’s response was to limit her use of facilities and build a case for her
eviction.”4 The abuse she suffered was widespread and severe.5
Verbal abuse was harsh and obscene, including terms such as
“fucking dyke” and “fucking faggot.”6 One resident threatened to
“rip [her] tits off.”7 There was also actual physical abuse. One resident rammed his walker into the motorized scooter Wetzel uses to
get around, knocking her off a ramp.8 Another “bashed her wheelchair into a dining table that Wetzel occupied, flipping the table
on top of Wetzel.”9 In another incident, she was struck in the head
and knocked off her scooter. People spat at her in the elevator.10
Wetzel routinely reported this abuse to St. Andrew, but they
“were apathetic.”11 Not only that, but they also took “affirmative
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steps to retaliate against Wetzel for her complaints.”12 They gave
her a less favorable spot in the dining room. They halted her
cleaning services. They barred her from the lobby except to get
coffee. They accused her of smoking in her room; when she said
she had been sleeping, one of them slapped her in the face. They
began building a case for her eviction, and they did nothing to
discipline the harassing tenants.13
Wetzel’s Tenant’s Agreement guaranteed access to common
facilities, including a community room and a laundry room, and
three meals daily served in a central location.14 Wetzel, however,
could not avail herself of those guaranteed privileges: “She ate
meals in her room, forgoing those included as part of the [Tenant’s] Agreement. . . . She did not use the laundry room at hours
when she might be alone. And she stayed away from the common
spaces from which she had been barred by management.”15
Eventually, Wetzel sued St. Andrew, claiming that “it failed
to provide her with non-discriminatory housing and that it retaliated against her because of her complaints, each in violation of
the Fair Housing Act.”16 St. Andrew maintained that the Fair
Housing Act17 (FHA) imposes liability only on those who “act with
discriminatory animus,” which Wetzel had not alleged.18 The district court agreed, dismissing Wetzel’s suit. Wetzel appealed the
dismissal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.19
Writing for the three-judge panel, then–Chief Judge Diane
Wood offered an account of the FHA that “read [it] more broadly”
than the district court did.20 In her view, the issue turned crucially
on what Marsha Wetzel was unable to do: whether the discrimination was sufficiently pervasive and severe to constitute what
Chief Judge Wood, analogizing to Title VII sexual harassment
cases, termed a “hostile housing environment.”21 To determine
this, the court needed to understand what opportunities and privileges Wetzel was guaranteed in the Tenant’s Agreement and how
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far the discrimination interfered with those privileges, preventing her from doing things she was supposed to be able to do.22
Further, the court insisted that in such a situation of pervasive
discrimination, inactivity on management’s part is sufficient for
liability under the FHA.23 In Wetzel’s case, management went beyond inactivity and engaged in retaliation.
A crucial backdrop to Wetzel v Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC24 is Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,25 in which the Seventh Circuit ruled that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation is discrimination on the basis of
sex under Title VII.26 The Supreme Court has now concurred in
Bostock v Clayton County.27 Although Hively was not appealed
and therefore played no official role in Bostock, the Court’s reasoning is very similar to that used by the Seventh Circuit in
Hively. As Chief Judge Wood mentioned early in her opinion in
Wetzel, both parties accepted that the ruling in Hively “applies
with equal force under the FHA.”28 This therefore needs no further argument.
My analysis will set Wetzel in the context of a past exchange
between Judge Wood and me about my Capabilities Approach
(CA).29 I shall argue that we do not really need the CA to see what
is well done about Judge Wood’s opinion, but that her approach
dovetails methodologically with the CA. This convergence is not
surprising. My CA does not claim that judges should engage in
applied philosophy; instead I have claimed that a related approach is already in place in our legal tradition of thinking about
discrimination, both under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and under Title VII. Now we may add
the Fair Housing Act.
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29 See generally Diane P. Wood, Constitutions and Capabilities: A (Necessarily) Pragmatic Approach, 10 Chi J Int L 415 (2010); Martha Nussbaum, Reply to Diane Wood, Constitutions and Capabilities: A (Necessarily) Pragmatic Approach, 10 Chi J Int L 431 (2010).
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II. THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH, CONSTITUTIONS, AND
LEGISLATION
The CA has two related purposes, one descriptive and one
normative.30 As a descriptive project, which originated within international development economics, the CA holds that the most
significant and illuminating way to compare nations (or regions
or households)—the most pertinent space of comparison31—is not
GDP per capita, nor is it utility; rather, it is what the people in
question are actually able to do and to be. Methodologically, the
approach sought to replace lofty distanced economic accounts of a
nation’s well-being or quality of life with an account that moved
much closer to people and asks how the people are really doing in
matters of importance to them. We ask about capability, not actual functioning, because choice is salient in the approach: what
is important for people is to have real solid options—or what is
sometimes called “substantial freedoms”—not to be pushed into a
single mode of functioning, however glorious.
What was really going on in the background was that international development agencies were using average GDP as a
measure purporting to say how life was in a nation. It did not
really do that, since a nation might be very wealthy but not distribute those riches in a way that makes people able to do key
things that they want to do. This flaw had long been evident to
people on the ground, but such ordinary people could not just
walk into the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
For this reason, in all my books on the CA, I have talked endlessly
to such people and put their stories into my writing in order to
show what the GDP approach misses. I often have said that my
role is not to make up something utterly new, but to act as a kind
30 The CA is a “they” not an “it.” The theory was developed by Professor Amartya
Sen and by me, and there is now the large Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) dedicated to continuing the CA further. In this Essay, I state only my own
views, and do not comment on how far they differ from the views of others. For fuller
development of my own views, see generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities:
The Human Development Approach (Harvard 2012); Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of
Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Harvard 2006); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge 2000).
Differences between my views and those of Sen are discussed in Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities at 69–76 and further in Martha C. Nussbaum, Labor Law and the Capabilities
Approach, in Brian Langille, ed, The Capability Approach to Labour Law 62–81 (Oxford
2019). Since I can be taken as an authority on views that I created, I shall not include
further citations, except where a specific subject matter suggests them.
31 This is a common term in development economics for designating a parameter of
measurement.
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of lawyer for the interests of common people who want a flourishing life.
What, then, are capabilities? I identify three types. First are
what I call basic capabilities, the innate material out of which the
more interesting capabilities grow. Second are internal capabilities: characteristics of persons formed by training and opportunity
to make a choice in the relevant area. (In a very fruitful dialogue
with University of Chicago Professor James Heckman, it has become clear that this is the usage of the word “capability” in the
human capital movement, of which he is a leading exponent.)32
But people may have internal capabilities and be prevented from
exercising them, by political repression, social discrimination, or
lack of means. The type of capability most pertinent to the normative aspect of the CA is what I call combined capabilities: internal capabilities plus suitable political and social conditions to
choose the relevant functioning.
Such an approach can wax normative rather quickly. Indeed,
the CA’s descriptive use to specify a metric of comparison already
involved normativity. Some combined capabilities (for example,
the ability to sing while standing on one’s head) are trivial, and
nobody would claim that they are indices of how well a nation is
doing, or appropriate goals for public policy. Some capabilities are
outright bad (for example, the ability to harass women in the
workplace). One can measure the quality of life of a group by the
extent to which that bad capability is kept in check. In practice,
then, in saying that national or regional well-being should be
measured by capabilities rather than by GDP, our band of insurgents were always assuming that we’re talking about capabilities
that are both good and important. The Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) already single out dozens of these (especially in the domains of
health and education, since the United Nations is standoffish
about political liberties) in creating its comparative measures.
But I have taken the next step, defending a group of ten capabilities as normatively fundamental for political justice: a nation
cannot claim to be even minimally just unless these ten have all

32 See generally Heckman on Capabilities, in Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities,
Appx A at 193 (cited in note 30). Heckman also gave a superb plenary address on the two
approaches at the annual meeting of the HDCA at Georgetown University in September
2015, but so far as I am aware, it has not been published. For a later version of this paper,
see generally James J. Heckman and Chase O. Corbin, Capabilities and Skills (NBER
Working Paper 22339, June 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/PWH3-J3E5.
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been extended at a reasonably high threshold level to all the nation’s people.33 (You can see that, in many ways, my project dovetails with the international human rights movement.)
33

My list, the same in all three books and many articles:

The Central Capabilities
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters
of reproduction.
4. Senses, imagination, and thought. Being able to use the senses, to
imagine, think, and reason—and to do these things in a “truly human” way,
a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by
no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected
by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and
artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence;
in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified
anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails
protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social
interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting
this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of
others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of
race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, and national
origin.
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over one’s environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices
that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.
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How should these central capabilities be promoted in a nation? Well, one could always rely on legislation, but legislation is
fragile, and these are very fundamental entitlements. So, I have
suggested that a nation making a constitution should build protections for these ten into its enumeration of fundamental rights.
India and South Africa have already done a good deal of this, for
example. I am of course not suggesting that philosophers should
dictate to the many peoples of the world, and respect for diversity
is something I have theorized repeatedly. Mine is a persuasive
proposal, which people may take up if it suits them.
Invited to write a Supreme Court Foreword for the Harvard
Law Review (“Foreword”), I decided to pursue my
CA/Constitution proposal in the US context, asking how far our
own constitutional tradition has incorporated elements of CA-like
thinking, and using some of those conclusions to comment on
cases of the 2006 Term.34 My answer was complex: some of the
formative philosophical ideas shaping the CA (particularly ideas
of Aristotle and of the Greek and Roman Stoics) did animate some
of our Founders, especially James Madison and Thomas Paine,
and in a diffuse way worked themselves into our founding documents. On the one hand, the US Constitution itself does not go
where Paine determinedly goes, toward broad government protection for a wide range of social and economic capabilities. In areas
such as education and health, the Constitution is silent (although
Justice Thurgood Marshall did make a heroic effort to argue that
a right to education is implicit in the free speech right35). On the
other hand, there are a few areas in which our constitutional tradition does embody a very general type of capability reasoning,
focusing on what people are actually able to do and be rather than
on a more abstract notion of either freedom or equality. One area
I studied was the Free Exercise Clause, where the tradition has
not been content with the absence of persecution but has asked

B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having
the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able
to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into
meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.
See, for example, Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities at 33–34 (cited in note 30).
34 See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court 2006 Term – Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities; “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 Harv L Rev 4 (2007).
35 See, for example, San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1,
111–15 (1973) (Marshall dissenting).
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whether people are really able to exercise their religion, and exercise it on a basis of equality with others.36 Another, crucial for
us here, is discrimination, as understood in judgments of equality
under the Equal Protection Clause.37 I’ll shortly return to that
topic.
Judge Wood accepted an invitation from the American Philosophical Association to comment on my Foreword at a program
session in December 2008. We later decided to publish our exchange, and did so in the Chicago Journal of International Law
in 2010.38 She made many valuable points, such as examining a
variety of international documents that protect capabilities and
showing that capabilities not protected under the federal Constitution are sometimes protected in state constitutions.39 But, like
me, she was pessimistic about finding them all in the actual documents, and she was disposed to think that judges could not
simply read them in, unless there was a legislative hook.40 (I totally agree.) She did, however, sympathize with a canon of statutory construction holding that an act of Congress should not be
construed to violate the CA if there is another available construction that makes it consistent with the CA.41 And, more to my purpose in the present Essay, she said that a judge could think of the
CA methodologically, suggesting a set of questions judges might
ask of a constitutional provision.42 In the Foreword, I had indeed
argued that the CA suggests such a method, urging the judge to
get close to people and the complexities of their situation, rather
than retreating to a position of lofty formalism.43
III. CAPABILITIES AND SEX DISCRIMINATION:
EQUAL PROTECTION AND TITLE VII
Now we get to our topic: discrimination. In one section of my
Foreword, I examined a tradition of thinking about the Equal Protection Clause, in cases relating to putatively “separate but equal”
facilities.44 Here, I said, what the Supreme Court has done, and
rightly so, was not to rest content with formal symmetry, but to
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

See Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 60–64 (cited in note 34).
See id at 64–67.
See note 29.
See Wood, 10 Chi J Int L at 416–20 (cited in note 29).
Id at 428.
Id at 424–26.
Id at 424.
See Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 24–33 (cited in note 34).
Id at 64–67.

2020]

Harassment and Capabilities

2445

press the question, “What are the people actually able to do and
be?” I looked first at Brown v Board of Education,45 defending the
Court against Professor Herbert Wechsler’s famous critique that
urges courts to seek “neutral principles,” by which he meant principles so far removed from the doings and emotions of the parties
that the alleged inequality just disappears.46 I then examined
Loving v Virginia47 in a similar vein, saying that the Court rightly
refused the bogus and abstract symmetry of the Supreme Court
of Virginia (all is well because Blacks can’t marry Whites and
Whites can’t marry Blacks), insisting that in terms of how people
are enabled to act and choose in society, the anti-miscegenation
laws positioned the two races entirely differently.48
For our purposes, however, the most relevant case is United
States v Virginia,49 the case that opened the doors of the previously all-male Virginia Military Institute (VMI) to women.50 Here,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used a CA-like method of thought
in reaching the conclusion that the two programs (VMI and its
allegedly equal, female alternative, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin College) were not equal at
all: the program for women was profoundly inferior, and so the
sex-based restriction violates the Equal Protection Clause.51 If a
program is an adequate remedy for a denial of opportunity, she
says, it must “place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in ‘the position they would have occupied in
the absence of [discrimination].’” 52 This is a precise statement of
the notion of combined capability: the person’s total position
where opportunity is concerned. Virginia’s proposed formal symmetry of programs did not meet the test of capability. The Mary
Baldwin graduate, Justice Ginsburg concluded, lacked many opportunities characteristic of the VMI graduate. She was taught
by an inferior faculty, with fewer PhDs.53 Her curriculum was a

45

347 US 483 (1954).
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L
Rev 1, 17 (1959).
47 388 US 1 (1967).
48 Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 64–67 (cited in note 34).
49 518 US 515 (1996).
50 Id at 519.
51 Id at 557.
52 Id at 547 (alteration in original), quoting Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267, 280 (1977).
53 United States v Virginia, 518 US at 526.
46
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“pale shadow” of VMI’s.54 She did not enjoy the benefits of the supportive VMI alumni network.55 In short, however attractive the
formally symmetrical remedy seems from a distance, up close it
does not pass the test of promoting truly equal capabilities.
This Equal Protection Clause tradition is totally in line with
what the CA recommends: the relevant criterion is what people
are actually able to do and be. Of course the Court did not go out
and read a philosophical theory and then apply it; but the theory
in its origin is a kind of countertheory to ambitious types of formalism that ignore what is important to people.
Sex discrimination is sometimes, as in United States v Virginia, dealt with by constitutional law, under the Equal Protection
Clause. More often, however, it relies on Title VII. Sexual harassment litigation, in particular, is almost always grounded in Title VII, and on the long line of cases in which the Supreme Court
has agreed that workplace sexual harassment can be sex discrimination under Title VII if either an “economic quid pro quo” is involved or the harassment creates a “hostile working environment”
for the plaintiff.56 It is by now settled that to show a hostile work
environment a plaintiff need not show grave psychological injury.
She only needs to show that the conduct is “severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment,”57 on the basis of “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”58 This, especially the last clause, is capability talk: we are asked to look at
what the employee is able or unable to do, given the harassment.
Now we get to the heart of the matter for our purposes: employer liability. In a recent paper, Judge Wood has shown convincingly that there remains a lot of unclarity about this issue.59
I think one thing that does emerge with clarity is that a showing
of employer malice is not necessary for liability; the questions
that survive deal with other matters, such as whether employers
can avoid liability by having a written antiharassment policy. But
54 Id at 553, quoting United States v Virginia, 44 F3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir 1995) (Phillips dissenting).
55 United States v Virginia, 518 US at 552.
56 Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 64–65 (1986).
57 Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21 (1993).
58 Id at 23.
59 See generally Diane P. Wood, Sexual Harassment Litigation with a Dose of Reality,
2019 U Chi Legal F 395.
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let me consider just one case from the Seventh Circuit that seems
quite parallel to Wetzel, in which the court found liability simply
on the basis of total inaction. That case is Carr v Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp,60 and the author of the majority panel opinion is then–Chief Judge Richard Posner.61 Judge
Posner started his analysis by pointing out that the question is,
first, “whether the plaintiff was, because of her sex, subjected to
such hostile, intimidating, or degrading behavior, verbal or nonverbal, as to affect adversely the conditions under which she
worked.”62 This he graphically described, by depicting the obscene
and threatening behavior to which her fellow employees subjected
her on a daily basis (using demeaning sexual language and
stereotypes).63
The second question is whether the employer’s response to its
employees’ behavior was negligent. “It would be unrealistic to expect management to be aware of every impropriety committed by
every low-level employee. But if it knows or should have known
that one of its female employees is being harassed, yet it responds
ineffectually, it is culpable.”64 The two questions are “linked,”
Judge Posner remarked, “because the greater the harassment . . .
is—the likelier is the employer to know about it or to be blameworthy for failing to discover it.”65 In the case at hand, he concluded that negligence was amply proved. In an early period when
Mary Carr did not complain, Judge Posner still found that General Motors (GM) should have known about it. But he focused on
a period starting in August 1988 during which Carr actively complained. Judge Posner found GM’s response utterly inadequate:
“No disciplinary action was undertaken against any of Carr’s
coworkers; no one was even reprimanded for the harassment.
General Motors was astonishingly unprepared to deal with problems of sexual harassment, foreseeable though they are when a
woman is introduced into a formerly all-male workplace.”66 Later
he stated that “[n]o reasonable person could imagine that General

60

32 F3d 1007 (7th Cir 1994).
I first discussed this case in Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary
Imagination and Public Life 104–11 (Beacon 1996), and subsequently in Martha C. Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After: Power and Sex in Carr v Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp, 74 U Chi L Rev 1831 (2007).
62 Carr, 32 F3d at 1009.
63 Id at 1009–11.
64 Id at 1009.
65 Id.
66 Carr, 32 F3d at 1012.
61
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Motors was genuinely helpless, that it did all it reasonably could
have done.”67 “All it reasonably could have done” sets a demanding standard for management. As Chief Judge Wood remarked in
Wetzel, courts interpreting Title VII have refrained from turning
it into a general civility code, and have insisted that judges filter
out “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” 68 Employers are not liable if they fail to stop these
minor inconveniences, but they are liable if they fail to do all in
their power to stop pervasive and severe forms of discrimination.
IV. LIABILITY FOR HARASSMENT: THE FHA AND WETZEL
Title VII cases do two things important for the judge deciding
Wetzel. First, they establish that a hostile work environment
should be demonstrated by finding interference with functioning.
Hostile intent is neither here nor there: The inquiry is an objective one, using a notion akin to my notion of combined capability.
And mere displeasure is insufficient—interference with activity
needs to be shown. Second, Title VII establishes that mere inaction and mere absence of discriminatory animus are insufficient
to get management off the hook. It needs to address, energetically
and as best it can, the root of the problem: interference (by the
discriminators) with the plaintiff’s ability to function.
What remained to be established in Wetzel, then, was that
the FHA sets similar standards for both hostile environment and
liability. The facts are very similar to the facts in Carr, both as to
the severity of the harassment and as to management’s complete
failure to take relevant remedial steps:
We have no quarrel with the idea that direct liability for inaction makes sense only if defendants had, but failed to deploy, available remedial tools. St. Andrew protests that it can
only minimally affect the conduct of its tenants because tenants expect to live free from a landlord’s interference.
Control in the absolute sense, however, is not required for
liability. Liability attaches because a party has “an arsenal
of incentives and sanctions . . . that can be applied to affect
conduct” but fails to use them. St. Andrew brushes aside the

67

Id.
Wetzel, 901 F3d at 866 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Faragher v City of Boca
Raton, 524 US 775, 788 (1998).
68
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many tools for remedying harassment that it has pursuant to
the [Tenant’s] Agreement. For example, the Agreement allows St. Andrew to evict any tenant who “engage[s] in acts or
omissions that constitute a direct threat to the health and
safety of other individuals” or who “engages in any activity
that [St. Andrew] determines unreasonably interferes with
the peaceful use and enjoyment of the community by other
tenants.”69
Indeed, St. Andrew was worse off than General Motors was in
Carr: for it did not do nothing, it actively retaliated against Wetzel for her complaints. To prove retaliation, Chief Judge Wood
reasoned, a plaintiff need not show hostile intent on the part of
the defendant, in this case some type of discriminatory animus.
Wetzel needed only to show that she engaged in a protected activity, that she suffered an adverse action, and that there was a
causal connection between the two.70 “Like all anti-retaliation
provisions, [the anti-retaliation provision of the FHA] provides
protections not because of who people are, but because of what
they do.”71
But how should the history of hostile environment sexual
harassment law under Title VII influence the judge trying a parallel case under the FHA? Chief Judge Wood considered Title VII
relevant in thinking about when harassment is severe or pervasive enough and especially in concluding that the defendant need
not act with discriminatory animus.72 “The FHA followed Title VII
by four years. St. Andrew provides no reason why the FHA requires in all instances that the defendant acted with discriminatory animus when an identically worded statute has not been read
in such a matter. As a textual matter, we see none.”73 However,
Chief Judge Wood refrained from “reflexively adopting the Title VII standard.”74 A further “search for comparable situations”

69 Wetzel, 901 F3d at 865 (citations omitted) (first, third, and fourth alterations in
original).
70 Id at 868. Recall that after Wetzel complained, management “restricted her access
to facilities and common spaces, downgraded her dining seat, halted her cleaning services,
and attempted to build a case for her eviction.” Id at 867. See also text accompanying
notes 9–11.
71 Id at 868.
72 She did not actually cite Carr. That is my contribution, since it is from the Seventh
Circuit; but she didn’t need to. There were plenty of cases she could have used to make
her points.
73 Wetzel, 901 F3d at 863 (citations omitted).
74 Id.
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led her to Title IX, where similar standards are in play.75 As for
the FHA itself, it creates a statutory duty not to discriminate, and
the areas in which most of the discrimination occurred were the
public areas, over which the landlord has responsibility. After all,
“the protections afforded by the Fair Housing Act do not evaporate once a person takes possession of her house, condominium,
or apartment.”76 Does the FHA cover the particular type of discrimination Wetzel suffered? Yes, because it prohibits “discriminatory harassment that unreasonably interferes with the use and
enjoyment of a home—by another name, a hostile housing environment.”77 A hostile housing environment claim requires a
plaintiff to show
(1) that she endured unwelcome harassment based on a protected characteristic; (2) the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to interfere with the terms, conditions, or privileges of her residency, or in the provision of services or
facilities; and (3) that there is a basis for imputing liability to
the defendant.78
The isomorphism between Title VII and the FHA can be supported from within the text of the FHA.
To show the second requirement, Chief Judge Wood returned
to Wetzel’s capabilities (though without using that word). She
wasn’t just displeased, she was disabled. She couldn’t eat the
meals she had paid for, she couldn’t use the lobby or other common spaces, and she couldn’t use the laundry room.79 Some of
these involved explicit violations of the Tenant’s Agreement, and
all were significant diminutions of Wetzel’s opportunities to use
her rental.
The district court’s dismissal of Wetzel’s complaint was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
V. JUDGES AND PHILOSOPHERS
Judge Wood reached a result that is similar to what someone
using the CA as a method would say. Of course she didn’t read
into the case the full normative framework of the CA: she used
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the normative materials that the relevant statutes gave her. And
she did something the philosopher would not know how to do
without a lot of further training: she used the facts and the law
in an astute and reasonable manner, building on precedent, looking closely at the language of the statute, and consulting other
relevant statutes that propose similar frameworks. This is legal,
not philosophical, thinking, and she would have reasoned well
had she reasoned purely in the manner of the philosopher. Here,
as often, the common law provides continuity and solidity because
of its way of combining reliance on precedent with openness to
extension in the light of new cases.80
Why, then, do we need the CA at all? What does it bring to
law when judges already know what they are doing? One use for
the CA, and the primary one I had in mind, was to assist makers
of constitutions—or indeed framers of statutes—to think well
about which human capabilities might be in need of protection.
That use is not at issue here, though perhaps it was in Hively,
when discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was held to
be a type of sex discrimination. Another use for the CA, however,
is as a method of judging, one that focuses on people and what
they can be and do, and avoids the type of distanced formalism
represented by Professor Wechsler’s call for “neutral principles,”
since the Wechslerian standpoint looks at human lives from such
a lofty difference that salient inequalities in what people are able
to do and be cannot be seen. This use for the CA is amply represented in our entire legal tradition of thinking about sex discrimination, under both the Equal Protection Clause and Titles VII
and IX—and as we now learn from Judge Wood, under the FHA.
It was the main contention of my Foreword that judges should
think this way whenever inequality is potentially at issue.81
Yes, but obviously Judge Wood reached her conclusion in
Wetzel without turning to philosophy. Even more obviously,
Judge Posner reached his conclusion in Carr despite his wellknown hostility to philosophy.82 So why the philosopher? What
does Judge Wood bring to the table? Nothing, when people are

80 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Janus-Faced Law: A Philosophical Debate, in Saul Levmore
and Frank Fagan, eds, The Timing of Lawmaking 249, 274–77 (Edward Elgar, 2017).
81 See Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 64–67 (cited in note 34).
82 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,
111 Harv L Rev 1637, 1646–49 (1998).
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judging human situations with the requisite insight and complexity. Philosophy is not required to prove that it changes everything, and a philosophy that did should be suspect.
Instead, philosophy gives firmness to sound human judgment
when it is, as so often, prone to go astray in the direction of lofty
but obtuse formalism of the Wechsler variety: it supplies what we
might call a “countertheory” to the voices of lofty obtuseness in
our own heads. In my career, and in that of Professor Amartya
Sen, we have found those voices above all in formalist economics,
in which people of great mathematical sophistication but paltry
(often) human understanding create elegant structures that ignore what people actually seek. That’s how the CA was born. People seeking fruitful lives could not get a hearing at the World
Bank, but a philosophical approach proffered by a Nobel Prize
Winner might. (A philosopher would never get a hearing all on
her own.) Similarly, the CA reminds us why it is important to ask
in a searching way what Marsha Wetzel was unable to do, and
why that matters.
But there are many sources of obtuseness in human heads,
and it’s useful to have an articulated theory that holds in place
some of the outcomes of sensible human judgment. Immanuel
Kant put it well: people know pretty well what good practical
judgment is, but they are “easily led astray” because we are imperfect, selfish, and power-grabbing beings.83 That’s basically
what I think: judges don’t need philosophy so long as they are
judging with sound human understanding. Judge Wood, one of
whose great distinctions is her sound human understanding,
probably doesn’t need it at all. But having it there to turn to, when
others wax obtuse, is not such a useless thing either.

83 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in Ethical Philosophy:
The Complete Texts of Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals and Metaphyisical Principles of Virtue 16 (Hackett 1983) (James W. Ellington, trans) (originally published 1785)
(Akademie 405) (the authoritative edition of Kant, to which it is usual to cite in order to
ensure comparability among editions).

